In this paper …nancial contagion and crises are endogenized through the interactions among corporations, banks and the interbank market. We show that the lack of …nancial disciplines in a single-bank-…nancing economy generates informational problems and thus the malfunction of the interbank market, which constitutes a mechanism of …nancial contagion and may lead to a …nancial crisis.
INTRODUCTION
It has been documented that …nancial crises often accompany problems in …nancial institutions, probably even more so at some speci…c stages of development. The recent …nancial crisis Korea, and the major …nancial crises in Europe and America in the late 1920s and in earlier times, are some examples. This paper develops a theory which endogenizes …nancial crises through institutions related to the corporate sector, banks and the interbank market. The basic idea is that di¤erent ways of …nancing corporate investment projects may a¤ect the nature of bankruptcy in failing projects. This in turn a¤ects information in the interbank market. For …nancial institutions unable to commit to liquidate bad projects, there will be informational problems between entrepreneurs and banks, which will cause informational problems among banks in the interbank market. Severe information problems in the interbank market can lead to a market failure, which constitutes a mechanism for …nancial contagion and creates conditions for a …nancial crisis.
Our theory emphasizes the role of …nancial institutions in explaining …nancial crises, in particular the recent East Asian …nancial crisis. Right before the crisis, the East Asian economies had been doing so well that there was a major debate among economists concerning the nature of the "miracle." The breaking out of …-nancial crisis in East Asia presents great challenges to economists and policy makers.
A particularly puzzling phenomenon regarding the crisis comes from the comparison between Korea and Taiwan. Korea and Taiwan were both regarded as the major phenomenon of the so-called "East Asia Miracle." However, while Korea was at the center of the East Asian crisis, Taiwan was much less a¤ected -even though it too had been attacked by international speculators.
Is this di¤erence an accident? Our analysis on the functions of corporate and banking institutions will provide an answer to this puzzling phenomenon. Consistent with observations that the …nancial crisis in East Asia were deeply linked to their corporate …nancial problems, our theory suggests that di¤erent …nancing structures in East Asian economies generate profound impacts to the information in their …nancial markets, which further a¤ects …nancial stability.
Our theory can be summarized as follows. We endogenize information structures in two di¤erent kind of economies. In an economy where corporations are …nanced by multiple banks liquidation of bad projects/…rms becomes a norm in the economy.
Liquidation of bad projects makes information public so that the banks have better knowledge about each others' assets and solvency. In the rest of the paper, we term this kind of economy a multi-bank-…nance (MBF) economy.
In an economy where …nancing decisions to corporations are concentrated (e.g.
the Japanese main bank system or the Korean principal transaction bank system), however, liquidation of bad projects/…rms becomes an exception. Without liquidation of bad projects, banks with bad projects can easily hide bad news from others. We show that in such an economy bad projects are not be liquidated and thus the solvency of a …nancier is not known to other …nanciers. In the rest of the paper, we call this kind of economy as single-bank-…nance economy (SBF).
In our model, an economy has many banks which receive deposits (à la Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and invest in long-term projects with stochastic returns. Moreover, there is an interbank market which may solve liquidity shortage problems among banks. That is, when a bank faces a liquidity shock it may borrow from others in the market. The function of the interbank market depends on the information of borrowing banks' asset quality. When an equilibrium is such that bad projects are liquidated, which can be observed by other banks, the interbank can function well and through trading among banks it can solve the liquidity problem faced by illiquid banks.
However, if lending banks in the interbank market are unable to distinguish solvent and insolvent borrowing banks, i.e. there is a pooling equilibrium, all illiquid banks are treated in the same manner. In that case, asymmetric information between …nanciers will make the interbank lending market a "lemon" market. In this lemon market, all borrowing banks face the same nominal expected cost. This implies that solvent banks will have to subsidize the borrowing of insolvent banks. With private information about one's own solvency, a better-quality borrowing bank will face higher costs of borrowing due to this implicit subsidy.
When a liquidity shock is severe enough, such high borrowing costs can push a solvent bank to choose between liquidating assets and facing a bank run. We assume that a liquidation implies a poor management while a well managed bank can still experience a bank run due to exogenous liquidity shocks; and bank managers have career concern. Thus, from a bank manager's perspective, a liquidation is worse than a bank run. As a result, illiquid banks with better-quality assets may not borrow and face a bank run earlier than other banks. Moreover, a bank run on better banks will deteriorate the quality of the lending market which may trigger more bank runs by the same logic. We then further demonstrate bank run contagious risks can lead to the collapse of the lending market and thus a …nancial crisis, in particular when the investment projects are heterogeneous in quality.
We also show that a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market does not always lead to a …nancial crisis when there are only idiosyncratic shocks and the projects are heterogeneous in quality. This is because the expected borrowing cost for good banks monotonically decreases with the average quality of the projects in the economy and the homogeneity of the projects' quality. If the average quality of the projects is high, and/or the projects are very homogeneous in quality, the interbank market works well and there is no bank run or …nancial crisis. But when the projects are heterogeneous, as long as the average quality of the projects is not very high, a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market becomes an incubator for …nancial crises.
This result has implications for the timing of a …nancial crisis in a pooling equilibrium economy. An economy should have no trouble when most of its sectors are similar, e.g., most projects are at similar imitation stages; but the situation will change when the projects are more heterogeneous, such as when the imitation stage of the economy has ended.
One of our major contributions to the literature is to model the function and failure of the interbank market with the presence of both liquidity and technological shocks and imperfect information. 1 We show that a certain type of …nancial institutions (MBF) makes information in the market symmetric; in that case bank runs are contained. A contagious bank run in our model is a result of an interbank market failure due to informational problems, which are caused by the SBF institution. We endogenize the Akerlof's (1970) lemon problem and extend it from real markets to the liquidity market between lenders and borrowers. In a separate paper (Huang and Xu, 2001), we further extend our analysis of banks' liquidity management in a model with interbank market and liquidation of real assets.
von Hayek (1945) outlined a principle according to which it is the market, rather than the government, that provides the right information for the economy to operate e¢ciently. However, what this means in the context of a …nancial crisis is unclear.
One of our major contributions is to provide a model to illustrate that a commitment mechanism to liquidate bad projects can make solvency information available to the market on a timely basis.
With respect to the recent literature on …nancial crisis, Aghion, Bolton, and Dewatripont (1999) and Allen and Gale (2000) are related to our work, but their emphases are quite di¤erent from ours. Aghion, Bolton, and Dewatripont (1999) focus on systemic shocks to the entire banking system. In comparison, we focus on …nancial crisis caused by idiosyncratic shocks. We study a mechanism of negative externalities in the interbank market that transforms idiosyncratic shocks into a systemic liquidity shock, and thus bank failure contagion. Allen and Gale (2000) derive …nancial contagion from the incompleteness of the structure of interregional claims. If we reinterpret our interbank market as a form of interconnectedness among all the banks in their model, then we show that even with a complete structure of interregional claims, informational problems in the market can still lead to …nancial contagion.
Moreover, in our model, the pooling and separating equilibria in the interbank 1 See Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Rochet and Tirole (1996) for contributions on modeling the interbank market with liquidity trading. market are endogenized through two types of …nancial institutions. A …nancial system where key decisions on project re…nancing are made by "multi creditors" is more likely to liquidate bad projects ex-post. The reason is that the costs of renegotiation are higher when there are multi-creditor decisions; hence liquidations are more likely to occur; that is, multi-bank …nancing can be used as a commitment device to create a separating equilibrium. In contrast, …nancial systems where key decisions are made by single creditors do not face such high renegotiation costs and thus are more likely to reorganize rather than to liquidate; that is, the system is not able to commit to stopping bad projects, thus good and bad projects are pooled together. Examples of such single-creditor systems include the main-bank system in Japan and the principaltransaction-bank system in Korea.
To focus on our major points, we analyze two types of a "pure" economy: a SBF economy whereby only a pure pooling equilibrium exists, and a MBF economy whereby only a pure separating equilibrium exists. We also suppose that the choice of the …nancial system in an economy depends on some exogenous reasons that make multi-…nancier …nancing too costly, such as high costs to enforce contracts. The idea about using multi-…nanciers as a commitment device is inspired by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Hart and Moore (1995) , and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y overviews the …nancial institutions in Korea and Taiwan. Section 3 establishes the basic structure of the model. Section 4 endogenizes information distributions between banks and corporations and in interbank market. Section 5, in particular subsections 5.3 and 5.4, investigates how bank run contagion are created in a SBF economy and when it can lead to a …nancial crisis. Section 6 discusses policy implications on central bank's lending of the last resort policy and other issues. Finally, section 7 concludes with some quali…cations and elaborations of our theory in relation to the existing literature, and some further discussions of policy implications. The appendix contains proofs of some lemmas.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CORPORATE FINANCING IN

KOREA AND TAIWAN
Korea and Taiwan are at similar development stages, geographically close, and they also have similar technologies, labor inputs, and high savings. In both economies the share of trade in GNP is much higher than the world average; and each economy has been transformed from traditional one into a high tech oriented one. Moreover, both were regarded as the major phenomenon of the so-called "East Asia Miracle." However, while Korea was at the center of the East Asian crisis, Taiwan was much less a¤ected -even though it too has been attacked by international speculators. Is this di¤erence an accident?
In this section we present brief overviews of the Korean and Taiwanese economies to illustrate that their …nancial institutions are quite di¤erent, and how this di¤erence may related to their di¤erent performances in the East Asia Financial Crisis.
It is well documented that Korean development has been characterized by the establishment of large conglomerates (chaebols) through government-coordinated bank loans. In a typical case, …nancing decisions for projects in Korea are made by the government or by the principal bank among a group of investing banks. For example, in the 1970s the Korean government promoted investment in the heavy and chemical industries by selecting projects and providing subsidized loans. In the 1980s the government promoted specialization in the largest chaebols through a similar …nanc-ing approach. In the two decades since the early 1970s, more than half of Korean domestic credits were distributed as government policy loans with low rates (Stern et al., 1995; Cho and Kim, 1995) . 2 It is well documented that the decision making of policy loans were concentrated in the hands of the government. 2 A closely related fact is that Korean …rms were over-leveraged as their average debt-equity ratio was among the highest in the world since the 1970s (Borensztein and Lee, 1998; . Before the outbreak of the 1997 crisis the average debt-equity ratio of thirty top chaebols was about 4.5.
Moreover, a recent econometric work shows that a signi…cant part of the total credit in Korea was not used productively (Demetriades and Fattouh, 1998 ).
The subsidized government loans led to distortions in corporate capital structure: between 1965 and 1970, the debt-equity ratio of manufacturing …rms in Korea increased from 0.94 to 3.29 (Nam and Kim) . To reform the ine¢cient loan allocation scheme, the Korean government established a credit control system called a "principal transactions banking system" in the mid-1970s. Under this system, the bank which was most involved …nancially with each chaebol was designated as the principal transactions bank to coordinate all lending activities. Any new credit to be issued by a bank to the chaebol was supposed to be evaluated by the principal bank.
However, this principal transactions banking system was not substantially di¤erent from the government-coordinated …nancing scheme. That is, …nancing decisions were concentrated to either the government or the principle bank.
Although there were complaints that with a predominance of government coordinated bank …nancing, credits were not allocated e¢ciently to Korean …rms, 3 the great success in the period of 1960s to the mid 1990s seems evident. Problems in corporate …nancing structure only become well noticed to outsiders when the East Asia Financial Crisis hit Korea. Some Korean economists claimed that excessive credit expansions caused 5 of the top 30 and 7 of the top 50 chaebols insolvent; it was documented that the insolvent chaebols had debt-equity ratios from 5.14 to 36 while the average of the 30 top chaebols was about 4.49 in April 1997 (Pak, 1997, p.1). A natural question to address is why creditors would be willing to continue providing credit to insolvent or nearly insolvent chaebols? A closely related fact to the high debt …nancing is that there was almost no bankruptcy in Korea before 1997 (particularly for chaebols). 3 Using panel data of thirty-two Korean manufacturing sectors in the period from 1969 to 1996, Borensztein and Lee (1998) show that credit was allocated preferentially to the sectors with larger …rms, with exports, and with worse economic performance. Examining …rm level data for the 1984 -86 period, Dailami and Kim (1994) discover that subsidized credit encouraged chaebols to hold more …nancial assets and real estate investments, but not actual productive assets. Moreover, …rms in Taiwan, were subject to e¤ective …nancial discipline that there had been frequent bankruptcies in the corporate sector in the past several decades.
Major Insolvent Chaebols
Ine¢cient …rms were indeed disciplined: the productivity of closed-down (disciplined) …rms was 11.4 percent to 15.5 percent lower than that of other …rms (Aw et al., 1998) . 4 Closely related to the ine¢ciencies of the projects being invested, the losses from projects …nanced by bank loans caused serious problems for Korean banks. At the end of 1986, nonperforming loans at the …ve largest commercial banks amounted to three times the total net worth of those banks (Park and Kim, 1994) . To relieve the troubled banks, between 1985 and 1987 the Bank of Korea provided them with more than 3 trillion won in subsidized loans (Nam, 1994) .
Implicitly complaining about the chronic problem of lack of …nancial discipline in Korean chaebols, some Korean economists claim that the excessive leveraged expansion ultimately resulted in the insolvency of …ve of the top thirty chaebols (Park, 1997) , thus triggering the …nancial crisis.
In the rest of the paper, we are going to explain how corporate …nancing determines …nancial disciplines of the …rms, and how this is related to …nancial stability.
THE MODEL
We consider a one-good economy, which has many entrepreneurs, M banks and bank managers, and N £ M depositors. For a project being …nanced, we assume that at date 1 an entrepreneur will learn its type, while the bank(s) still will not know the type. However, at date 2, the bank(s) will know the type of the project. If a project is of a bad type, it can be reorganized at date 2 and the best return a reorganized bad project can generate is X, and I 3 < X < I 2 + I 3 , that is, it is ex-ante unpro…table but can be ex-post pro…table. Therefore, at date 2 a decision has to be made by the bank(s) regarding a bad project: either to reorganize it or to liquidate it. 5 Concerning reorganization, we assume that there are two strategies a and b to reorganize a bad project during the third period, but only one of them can generate a pro…t ex post. The decision on a speci…c strategy the bank(s) selects depends on 5 The setup of the model shares some features with Qian and Xu (1998 project is reorganized and completed, it will generate a private bene…t b 3b > b 1 to the entrepreneur; in the case of a good project, it will generate a private bene…t,
In this economy, banks exist because they create liquidity and monitor investments on behalves of small depositors (Diamond, 1984; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990 ). Bank managers are hired to manage banks, to make investment decisions, and to monitor bank investments in …rms. They are risk-neutral, and do not want to be identi…ed as bad managers (e.g., career concerns).
All the M banks in the economy are ex-ante identical, and each N depositor deposits $1 in a bank. Thus, each bank's asset is $N . The M banks form an interbank market to trade liquidity. We assume that the liquidation of a bad project is observable by all the banks; while without liquidation the nature of a project …nanced by a bank is not observable by another bank that is not involved in the investment and monitoring of the project.
In our economy there are two types of risk-averse depositors, as described by Diamond and Dybvig (1983): early consumers only consuming at t = 1, and late consumers only consuming at t = 3. Ex ante, all depositors are identical and do not become aware of their types until t = 1. Moreover, each depositor's $1 endowment can be stored from one period to the next, without any cost, or it can be deposited in a bank which then invests in a project with stochastic technology, yielding a pos- 6 We use the term private-bene…t in such a general way that it includes both rewards and penalties.
itive expected return in the future. 7 They make their investment decision based on an ex-ante belief about the riskiness of the banking system and about the market equilibrium return on deposit. They supposedly do not have the required expertise to be entrepreneurs or bank managers, nor do they monitor banks because of high surveillance costs.
Each depositor's preference is de…ned as
where C j is the consumption of type j depositor; j = 1 being early consumers who consume at t = 1 and j = 2 being late consumers who consume at t = 3; ¼ j is the probability of a depositor being a type 1 or type 2 consumers, and
is the discount factor and ½ (R + 1) > 1; where R is the return from investment, which is to be determined in later sections; and u 0 > 0, u 00 < 0, and (Cu
Now we summarize the timing of the game as follows: However, unless a project is stopped by the entrepreneur the bank(s) still does (do) not know the type of the project and further I 2 units of money are invested into the project. Moreover, the bank(s) will know the probability distribution of their own projects better than other banks. Early consumers withdraw money from the banks, late consumers make their decisions wether to withdraw or to keep deposits in the banks. A bank facing too many early withdrawals has to borrow, otherwise it has to abort the project, resulting in no return.
² Date 2: The type of a project becomes public knowledge:
-If a project is a good type, a further I 3 will be invested.
-If it is a bad project, a decision whether to liquidate or to reorganize has to be made.
¤ If a project is liquidated the bank(s) gets zero and the entrepreneur
¤ if a project is reorganized, I 3 will be invested. -for a bad project, return X goes to the bank(s), entrepreneur gets b 3g > b 3b ;
-late consumers collect their rewards.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION
DISTRIBUTIONS
In this section, we endogenize information distributions between banks and entrepreneurs and in the interbank market. We demonstrate that in a SBF economy -investment decisions are made by one bank -there will be intrinsic problems in committing to liquidate bad projects. Thus at equilibrium, bad projects are not liquidated -a syndrome of soft-budget constraints (Kornai, 1980; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995) . As a consequence, when an entrepreneurs discover his private information that his project is a bad one he will pretend no bad news received.. Thus there will be information asymmetry between an entrepreneur and his …nancing bank, and no information about type of projects in the interbank market at date 1. In contrast, a MBF arrangement, according to which investment decisions are made by multiple banks, is a commitment device. Thus at equilibrium, when an entrepreneur discovers his private information about the type of a project he will immediately inform his bank, and thus bad projects are liquidated -a phenomenon of hard-budget constraints. As a result, there will be no information asymmetry between an entrepreneur and his …nancing bank, and type of projects will become public knowledge in the interbank market at date 1.
In our model, there are numerous entrepreneurs and M banks in an economy.
When an entrepreneur proposes a project to a bank, the bank can either …nance the project alone, or it can co-…nance the project with other banks. We refer to the former as a case of single-bank …nancing, and to the later as a case of multi-bank co-…nancing. Here, the term single-bank …nancing not only refers to genuine singlebank …nancing but also broadly re ‡ects real situations in which …nancing decisions are made by one agent, such as cases of government-coordinated …nancing where the government makes …nancing decisions, and the principal bank system where the principal bank makes the decisions (e.g., in South Korea). Multi-bank co-…nancing refers to cases where multiple banks/investors are involved in investment decisions.
In order to make our point in a simplest way, we model a special case of multi-bank co-…nancing: two banks jointly …nance a project (the extension from two to many would not alter our qualitative results). We assume that banks A and B have di¤erent technological or banking market specialties (e.g., they cover di¤erent geographic areas or di¤erent industries etc.).
If a project is a good one, it generates a high return Y no matter whether it is …nanced by one bank alone or jointly by two banks. That is, from the perspective of the …nancing decision there is no di¤erence between these two …nancing methods.
Consequently, in the rest of the paper we will focus on the case of bad projects.
The following are the assumptions regarding how reorganization strategies are re-lated to information s A and s B . 8 We start from e¢ciency conditions. The …rst e¢ciency condition (A-1.1) is that strategy b makes the project ex-post pro…table if the value of signal s A is higher than the value of s B ; and strategy a makes the project ex-post pro…table if the value of signal s A is lower than that of s B .
The second e¢ciency condition (A-1.2) is that the outcome of a wrong strategy is so ine¢cient that the expected net payo¤ of randomizing between the two strategies is worse than liquidation.
Finally, a con ‡ict of interest condition (A-2) states that a higher value of s A is more bene…cial to bank A if the project is reorganized under strategy a than under strategy b; and vice versa. This assumption implies that each bank J has an incentive to use strategy j if its own signal value is higher. 9 An example is provided in the appendix.
In the case of multi-bank co-…nancing, ex-post the two banks have to share their private information as long as they decide to reorganize a bad project. Given the private nature of the information and con ‡icts of interests between the two banks, the private information can only be transferred from one bank to the other if the required compensation for such the transfer is not overly expensive. This is equivalent to saying 8 There are many possible reasons why banks A and B may have di¤erent information ex post if they co-…nance, but any bank can have full information ex post if any one of them …nances a project alone. One possible reason is that observing information sA and sB ex post requires a knowledge of ¹ sA and ¹ sB which can only be observed earlier and which is essential for the pro…t of a good project.
Given their specialities, bank A can observe ¹ sA with no costs, but has to pay a cost cA to observe signal ¹ sB; and bank B can observe ¹ sB with no costs, but has to pay a cost cB to observe signal ¹ sA.
Therefore, in the case that banks A and B co-…nance a project, they can collect ¹ sA and ¹ sB without incurring costs. In the case of single-bank …nancing, bank J will collect signal ¹ sJ and pay cost cJ to collect information ¹ s ¹ J , where J; ¹ J = A; B; and J 6 = ¹ J ; unless there are some other reasons, such as some contractual arrangements that prevent the two banks from sharing information.
The assumption that sJ can only be observed after I3 is invested is not essential in the model. Its role is to rule out mixed strategies which will complicate the model without providing more insight.
Moreover, it is quite realistic. 9 For formal expressions of (A-1) and (A-2), see the Appendix.
that bank B would buy private information s A from bank A when the price that bank B has to pay, T (s A ; s B ), is not too high. The logic is the same if bank A buys s B from bank B.
Multi-Bank Co-Financing
To analyze the investment decision-making process in multi-bank co-…nancing, we start with the re…nancing decision at date 2 and then consider the entrepreneur's investment decision at date 1. At date 2, when the two banks discover that the project is a bad one, they should decide wether to liquidate or to reorganize (i.e., the banks assign a probability of p to re…nance the project 10 ). If they decide to reorganize the project, they will invest I 3 into the bad project. Then information s A and s B are observed by the two banks respectively and the banks need to decide an optimal reorganization strategy based on what they have observed (i.e., the banks assign probabilities of 1 ¡ q(s A ; s B ) and q(s A ; s B ) to use reorganization strategy a and b respectively).
In the following we show formally that under conditions (A-1) and (A-2), when a bad project is revealed to the co-investors -the two banks -at date 2, the con ‡icts between these two banks make it impossible for them to agree on an e¢cient reorganization scheme. See the appendix for proof.
Lemma 1 Under conditions (A-1) and (A-2)
, and under multi-bank co-…nancing, all bad projects will be liquidated at date 2.
The central message of this lemma is that the informational asymmetry and con‡icts of interest between two banks in …nancing a project can increase the costs of reorganizing a project so that liquidation is always better than reorganization. The rationale behind this lemma is the following. Let us look at the case where bank B buys information s A from bank A by paying T (s A ; s B ) (the case where bank A buys 10 For example, if their decision is to de…nitely liquidate the project, they assign p = 0:
information s B from bank B is exactly symmetrical). That is, an optimal compensation scheme T (s A ; s B ) is designed such that if A tells the true value of s A then A will be better o¤ than doing otherwise -the incentive compatibility condition (IC). If we look at the (IC) in the case where the value of s A is higher than s B , and the (IC)
in the opposite case, and then combine them together with the con ‡ict of interest condition (A-2), we …nd that under the optimal compensation scheme T (s A ; s B ); the incentives of A will lead to a condition that for any given value of s B ; the higher the value of s A , the less likely that strategy b should be used. The e¢ciency condition (A-1.1), however, implies that for any given value of s B ; the higher the value of s A , the better to use strategy b more often. The only reconciliation between these two conditions is to keep the probability of using strategy b independent from signal s A , but the e¢ciency condition (A-1.2) implies that this kind of reorganization will make losses ex post, thus it is worse than liquidation. 11 The commitment to liquidate bad projects by the multi-banks' co-…nancing has a deterrent e¤ect on entrepreneurs who have discovered bad projects. Afraid of further losses of private bene…ts by hiding bad news, an entrepreneur will choose to quit a bad project once he discovers it because the losses incurred by quitting at date 1 are smaller than those incurred at date 2, i.e., b 2b < b 1 . To summarize, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 Under conditions (A-1) and (A-2), with multi-bank co-…nancing, at equilibrium all bad projects are liquidated at date 1.
Given our assumption that liquidation is observable by other banks, the above proposition has an important implication on information in the interbank market. 11 For the sake of simplicity, in the proof of this lemma in the Appendix, only the case of co…nancing by two banks is analyzed. It is straightforward to extend this to co-…nancing by more banks. In addition, the more banks that are involved in the joint investment, the easier it is to satisfy the conditions of asymmetric information and con ‡icts of interests, thus the more likely to reach our results.
Corollary 1 Under multi-bank co-…nancing, the type of projects becomes public knowledge in the interbank market at date 1.
Single-Bank Financing
We again begin our analysis of the decision-making process with the re…nancing decision at date 2 and then consider the entrepreneur's investment decision at date 1. Note that under single-bank …nancing, the bank will have all the information s A and s B and will be able to use this information to choose an ex-post e¢cient strategy to reorganize the project such that payo¤ X ¤ (s A ; s B ) is greater than the ex-post cost of re…nancing, I 3 . Therefore, the bank is not able to commit to terminating a bad project ex post.
Moreover, the fact that the bank cannot commit to terminating a bad project a¤ects the entrepreneur's ex-ante incentives to reveal information. When the entrepreneur at date 1 discovers that his project is a bad one, he anticipates that the project will always be continued and re…nanced by the bank at date 2. Consequently, if he decides to quit the project, he gets private bene…t b 1 ; if he decides to continue the project, the bad project will always be re…nanced by the bank and will generate a private bene…t b 3 > b 1 for him. Therefore, the entrepreneur will always choose to continue a bad project after he privately discovers its type.
Proposition 2
Under assumption (A-1), all single bank-…nanced bad projects will be reorganized ex post.
The intuition behind this result is that without con ‡icts of interest and informational asymmetry on the side of the bank, single-bank …nancing is not able to solve the asymmetric information problem between the bank and the entrepreneur due to the lack of a commitment to liquidate bad projects.
Concerning the implication of the above proposition on information in the interbank market, we have the following result.
Corollary 2 Under single-bank …nancing, at equilibrium the type of projects is not known by banks at date 1.
FINANCIAL CONTAGION AND FINANCIAL CRISES
To make our basic point in the simplest possible way, we make some simpli…ca-tion assumptions, in particular we abstract government away from our model in the section. We will incorporate the role of government into our model later.
Deposit Contract
Similar to Diamond and Dybvig, in our model a market equilibrium in which all agents trade can Pareto dominate that of autarchy; but the market equilibrium does not necessarily provide a perfect insurance against liquidity shocks. The main reason in our model is that there may be information asymmetry in the interbank market which can give rise to contagious risks.
At date 0, consumers make a deposit decision by solving
In general, the …rst order condition of this problem is
Following Diamond and Dybvig we assume that Cu 0 (C) is a decreasing function of C (that is u 0 + Cu 00 < 0), thus for ½ < 1 and ½¸R > 1, we have
Consequently, an ex-ante optimal market equilibrium can only be achieved by increasing C 1 and decreasing C 2 , that is
A bank can implement the market solution through a deposit contract a la Diamond and Dybvig. That is for $1 deposit at t = 0, a depositor receives either C ¤ 1 at t = 1, or C ¤ 2 at the end of the exercise. For each dollar it receives as deposit, the bank holds ¼ 1 C ¤ 1 (as cash) at no extra cost, and invests the rest in illiquid technology which yields a higher return. As banks are competitive in the economy, at C ¤ 1 and C ¤ 2 banks on average earn zero pro…t. This ex-ante optimal deposit contract is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. That is, an early consumer always wants to consume at t = 1, but a late consumer has no incentive to withdraw early. This is because as long as
, and any deviation does not pay, as long as other late consumers do not deviate.
However, there may be a bank run equilibrium, that is, a simultaneous deviation of all late consumers. In this case, the bank has to liquidate its project (which has zero value for simplicity) if borrowing from the interbank market is not possible or too expensive. 12 As a result, the bank will fail and nothing will be left for late consumers when they withdraw later than others. Anticipating this, all late consumers will withdraw at t = 1, and a bank run becomes self ful…lling. A key for the existence of a bank run equilibrium is the possibility that a bank cannot solve its liquidity shortage problem by borrowing from the interbank market. This turns out to be a key condition to extend Diamond and Dybvig's framework from a one-bank economy to a multi-bank economy.
In our multi-bank economy the total number of depositors is …nite, with N depositors in each bank and the realized numbers of type 1 and 2 depositors for each bank are random draws from binomial distributions of ¼ 1 and
tively. In the next two subsections, we will analyze …nancial contagion in MBF and SBF economies. We start from the problem faced by the bank manager in a MBF economy. 12 In a separate paper (Huang and Xu, 2001) we allow banks to liquidate illiquid assets to solve their liquidity shortage problems. See Diamond and Rajan (1998) for an analysis of liquidating illiquid assets.
Bank Run in a MBF Economy
Following our results for a MBF economy, at equilibrium all bad projects are stopped at date 1 and all good projects are completed. Therefore, every bank knows that all continued projects are good ones. The ex-ante expected deposit return in such an economy is:
To meet an expected number of early withdrawals a bank's optimal investment decision is to store cash in the amount of N¼ 1 C ¤ 1 , and to invest all the rest -in the amount of
Every bank co-invests with another bank in one project, given the symmetry of the banks, and the investment is made in the following way,
In the event that a project is a bad one and aborted at date 1, the realized value from the investment is zero. In this case, if there are more than ¼ 1 N +¸(
depositors trying to withdraw at date 1, the bank will run out of cash because of the excessive demand for withdrawals. Because it is known that this bank has a bad project and will not be able to pay back its loan, it will not be able to borrow in the interbank market. Thus a bank run can occur with a positive probability in a MBF economy, when there are both technological shocks and liquidity shocks. 13 Now let us look at the case where a bank manager is informed at date 1 that the project is a good one, which will generate a good positive return at date 3. In this case, when there is an unexpected excess early withdrawals, the bank can borrow from other banks. 13 If late consumers can observe the liquidation of bad projects, a bank run will occur for sure after the bank's project is liquidated.
For the sake of simplicity, we do not allow the bank with a bad project to start another project at date 1. Moreover, this setup avoids giving an MBF economy too great an advantage over an SBF economy, which would also divert our focus in the analysis.
As other banks in the interbank market also know that this bank has invested in a good project, they know this bank will de…nitely generate a return at
In this case, when the bank with a good project faces excess early withdrawals, it can borrow from other banks. 14 Therefore, a bank with good project can solve its liquidity shortage problem by borrowing from other banks so that a bank run is avoided.
Proposition 3
In a MBF economy, because of symmetric information among banks, a bank run occurs when a bank faces both technological and liquidity shock; but bankrun contagion is not possible.
The last point of the above proposition is more interesting. A MBF economy does not experience a contagious bank run simply because with symmetric information among banks, the interbank lending market is able to provide liquidity to all illiquid but solvent banks, these that are not hit by technological shocks. As a result, although there are still possible isolated bank runs in a MBF economy, bank-run contagion does not occur. 14 The bank can issue a risk-free bond to borrow from other banks. The bond has a face value of $1 and is sold at price p per share. p is determined by the competitive bank lending market. In equilibrium R H g¸1 =p and there is su¢cient demand for such a bond. From the supply side, since each bank stores N ¼1C Furthermore, because C ¤ 1 < C ¤ 2 , it is not worthwhile for any late consumers to withdraw deposits earlier (at date 1).
Bank Run in a SBF Economy
Following our earlier results, in a SBF economy without a commitment to liquidate bad projects at date 2, entrepreneurs with bad projects will cheat at date 1. Thus, at date 1 banks in a SBF economy do not know the exact type of a project that they are …nancing. However, we assume that every bank has a better understanding of the risk of its own project. That is, at date 1, the manager of bank m (m = 1; :::; M ); through her project-monitoring for one period of time, has better information than at date 0, such that she knows that the probability of her project being a good one iş m . But this is her private information. Suppose that the qualities of all banks can be ranked as¸1 <¸2 <¸3 < ::: <¸M , which is not known by any bank manager, but the average quality of banks,¸=
, is known to all banks. Anticipating the expected number of early consumers' withdrawal at date 1, a bank's optimal investment decision is to hold N ¼ 1 C ¤ 1 in cash and invest N (1¡¼ 1 C ¤ 1 ). That is, the expected investment of a bank is
Therefore, if the number of depositors who withdraw at date 1 is no more than the expected number ¼ 1 N , the bank will have enough cash to handle the withdrawals; however, if the number of early withdrawals is more than ¼ 1 N; the bank will have to borrow from the interbank market through issuing bond to meet the depositors' demands.
We assume that a borrower has a limited liability. That is, an illiquid borrowing bank can only repay its borrowing if it has a good project. However, given that the market knows only¸; all illiquid banks will be treated in the same way when they borrow. Therefore, all bonds issued by borrowing banks have the same structure: contingent on the realization of the project at date 3, the bond pays, To highlight our points, we assume that there is a Bertrand competition among all lending banks such that these banks break even in lending. Hence, given the lenders' belief that the probability that a bank will pay back 1 is 1 ; the equilibrium bond price is p S = 1 .
For an illiquid bank to raise $1, it needs to issue 1 1 shares of bonds in the interbank market. Thus, in order to deal with n excessive early withdrawal consumers for an amount of nC ¤ 1 , a total of
1 shares of bonds should be issued. While the bond structure is the same for all illiquid banks, with the private information about the quality of each bank's project, the borrowing cost for each bank is di¤erent. For bank m, with a probability of being able to repay the bond as¸m, the cost of raising each dollar is¸m 2 . Therefore, the higher the quality of a bank, or the higher the ratio¸m ; the higher the borrowing cost for bank m. Not surprisingly, the ratio¸m should not be too high and 1 should not be too low to make the expected pro…t of bank m non negative through borrowing.
Lemma 2 With borrowing in the interbank market a good bank is still solvent if
Proof. A bank's non-negative expected return condition is
Thus the lower bound of the bond price which satis…es the above condition is,
Recall that the demand deposit contract speci…es that a bank pays o¤ its investment returns to early and late depositors, thus late consumers get:
Using this condition, we have,
Using the following relationships,
we have
Thus an illiquid bank will have a non-negative expected pro…t after borrowing only when p · 1 = p S , which occurs if
Here, the ratio¸¹ . To facilitate our analysis, we de…nȩ
Then applying the above Lemma, we have the following results. The above results show that when 1 is su¢ciently high, the interbank market will work well in a SBF economy. In the following we show that when 1 is low and in particularly if¸m 1 is high, the interbank market may not function.
, there exist a n such that borrowing from the interbank to meet or any n > n withdrawals would make an illiquid bank insolvent.
Proof. Again using the condition
a bank's expected return is
we can easily see that the expected return decreases in n, if¸m 2 >
From zero expected return condition, we have the cut-o¤ point n,
This result shows that for a given ratio
, which is determined by consumers' utility function and exogenous parameters I i ; Y; X;¸; ¼ 1 , when 1 is relatively too low, or/and the degree of heterogeneity,¸m ; is relatively too high, borrowing from the interbank market will not be helpful for banks to deal with liquidity shocks with n > n.
In the following we are going to analyze bank run equilibrium in a SBF economy. To make our point in a simpler way, we suppose that a bank manager has an incentive to avoid being identi…ed as a poor manager. We also assume that a bank being liquidated is perceived by the economy as an indication of bad management; while a bank run is not perceived so since a well-managed bank may also su¤er from a bank run. Thus, from the perspective of a bank manager, an expected liquidation at date 3 is worse than a bank run at date 1. Therefore, when a manager has to choose between facing an expected liquidation at date 3 and a bank run at date 1, she will choose the latter. 15 Given these assumptions applying the above Lemmas, we have the following results. , there exist a n such that for any n > n, this bank will su¤er from a bank run.
The …rst result implies that if the uncertainty of projects …nanced by banks is very low, or if banks invest in very safe projects (e.g., projects featured by simple technological imitation) such that 1 2 >¸¤, there is no bank run in a SBF economy. This is because the average quality of the projects are good enough for lenders to lend to all the illiquid banks. That is, under that condition, asymmetric information in the interbank market is not a serious problem.
The second result says that if the uncertainty of projects is at a moderate level such that 1¸¸¤ > 1 2 , then as long as projects are very homogeneous, there is still no 15 The same qualitative result can be derived without this assumption but at the costs of a more complicated analysis.
bank run in the economy. This is so because when projects are highly homogeneous, the degree of asymmetric information is low (in the case of perfect homogeneous, there is no asymmetric information). Given that the average quality of the projects in the economy is not too bad, the interbank market functions well.
In contrast, in a MBF economy bad projects are always liquidated. Moreover, illiquid and insolvent banks may still su¤er bank runs even when the project pool is relatively safe. That is, a SBF economy may appear better than a MBF economy in terms of …nancial stability when the project pool of the banks in the economy is less uncertain. This result sheds some light on the 'East Asian Miracle' which happened before the mid 1990s when the project pool in those economies featured less uncertain
imitations.
The last result shows that when the average uncertainty of the projects in the economy is low (but not necessarily very low) such that 1 2 <¸¤, when the best illiquid banks (banks with high¸m ratio) satis…es the condition¸m 2 >
, these banks will be run by their depositors. This is because to avoid a consequence of liquidation these bank managers choose not to borrow. The implication of this result is grave to the economy. Because the bank run may generate negative externalities in the interbank market that it may induce a bank run contagion which can lead to a collapse of the banking system.
Bank-Run Contagion and Financial Crisis in a SBF Economy
For simplicity, we assume that the liquidity shock is exogenously given such that there are w illiquid banks that face excess early withdrawals. And the quality of these w banks can be ranked such that each illiquid bank i 0 s quality is¸i =¸i ¡1 + ¹ for all i = 1; 2; :::; w, and¸0 = ¹. Based on this setup, the average quality of all illiquid banks is¸w
Moreover, we continue to assume that the average quality¸w is known by all the banks, but each individual bank's¸i is not known by other banks.
To facilitate our analysis, we group the w banks into two partitions: good (W g ) and bad (W b ). In W b , a bank has a subscript i that 1 · i · w b ; in W g , a bank has a subscript i that w g < i · w, where w g = w b + 1. The following shows the relationship between the ranking of the banks and the partition.
For a given ranking of illiquid banks' quality and an exogenously given 1 w ; which is not too high relative to¸¤ that the Prop 4(i) condition is not satis…ed, we start our analysis with a partition W g in a way such that
Applying Proposition 4, the above conditions imply that all banks in partition W g are not going to borrow when facing with liquidity shocks. However, for all other banks, i.e. for banks in partition W b ; liquidity shortage can still be solved by borrowing regardless of the number of early withdrawals.
Given the extent of the liquidity shocks to W g banks, following the Proposition 4 these banks will su¤er from bank runs. Even so, if the market had an equilibrium with the above conditions, there will be at worst contained bank runs. However, the runs on W g banks generate externalities in the interbank market such that the above conditions can not support an equilibrium. When the W g banks are run by their depositors, the average quality of the remaining banks in the economy, 1 w b , will decrease to
Associated with a lower 1 w b , the deteriorated quality of the pool of borrowing banks pushes up the borrowing cost¸m 1 2 w b
. 16 As a result, relatively better banks in the 16 To keep the model simple, we assume that when the average quality of borrowing banks is partition W b stop from borrowing and face bank run. Let us group these banks into partition W b1 : With a lowered quality, 1 w b ; we now havȩ
An illustration of partition W b1 is as follows.
Following Proposition 4, W b1 banks are run by their depositors. As a result, the average quality of the remaining illiquid banks will be further lowered. This in turn will push the borrowing cost further up. The same process repeats that there will be additional bank runs, further deterioration of qualities of banks, and further lower bond prices until they reach a low enough level that no bank will issue a bond.
Observing the low bond price later consumers will infer deep troubles in the banking system and they will all be induced to withdraw at date 1 -a run to the banking system. At this point, the entire banking system collapses. The above situation is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5
In a SBF economy if 1 2 <¸¤ for the economy,¸m 2 >
for some best banks, and excess early withdrawals satisfy n > n for some of these banks, there exists bank run contagions which starts from the best illiquid banks and can lead to a collapse of the banking system.
The condition of bank run contagions in this result has implications for the timing of a …nancial crisis in a SBF economy. When an economy is technically less developed such that most investment projects are featured by imitations, the uncertainty of the projects is low and the bank run contagion condition is not satis…ed. However, when a SBF economy is more developed such that a large proportion of investment projects are in high tech or R&D-intensive, the projects are more uncertain (lower 1 ) and lowered, it is immediately known by all the banks. more heterogeneous (higher¸m 1 ): Then, the bank run contagion condition may be easily satis…ed.
This result sheds lights to the timing of East Asia Financial Crisis, in particular why Korea was hit by the crisis, and the Japanese economy stagnation since the 1980s. Since the early 1990s (the 1980s for Japan), Korean economy became more developed and it moved onto technological frontiers and invested more in high-tech projects and in innovations, its project pool became more uncertain, i.e. 1 <¸¤, and more heterogeneous, i.e.¸m 1 . So it began to meet the conditions for bank run contagion and could face a …nancial crisis when some liquidity shocks hit the economy. 17 In sharp contrast, in a MBF economy information about bank investment quality is revealed to all banks at date 1 because of the liquidation of bad projects. As a result of the symmetric information, bank runs are always restricted to insolvent banks and the interbank market never degenerates. Therefore, bank run contagion will never occur when there are only idiosyncratic shocks! To make our point in a simple way, our model is quite stylized. The model can be extended and modi…ed to better capture the reality. For example, it can be readily modi…ed by introducing imperfect monitoring from depositors in the sense of Postlewaite and Vives (1987) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) . If depositors' monitoring is more blurred than that of bank managers' such that depositors can divide the banks' qualities into groups but are not able to further distinguish them within each group, then lower quality groups of banks are more likely to su¤er liquidity shocks and bank runs. Moreover, the bank run contagion mechanism based on interbank lending market lemon problem can apply within each group of banks.
From this we can show a bank run contagion extending from bad groups to better groups. 17 Radelet and Sachs (1998) give detail accounts of "bank run" contagion in the East Asia …nancial Crisis.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Lender of Last Resort Policy and Financial Institutional Reform
Given risks of bank run contagion in a SBF economy, it is conceivable that the government may step in to bail out failing banks in order to contain bank runs and to stop …nancial contagion. Particularly, when there is a interbank market failure, it may be desirable for the government to provides liquidity to the interbank market through lender of last resort (LOLR) facilities in order to stabilize the interbank market and thus stop bank run contagion. However, the government also faces an adverse selection problem in the sense that it does not know the solvency of each bank at date 1. In the following we show that given the informational problem the best that the government can do is either to rescue all the banks regardless of their solvency, thus creating a bail-out trap, or to rescue none of them, thus leaving the banking system vulnerable to contagious risks and …nancial crisis.
We model LOLR policy as the government selling bonds to illiquid banks, whose loan portfolios serve as collateral. The bond with face value of $1 is sold at a price p G < 1, and an illiquid bank repays the bond at date 3 if its project turns out to be good, otherwise it pays nothing. We denote¸G as the government's perception of the average loan-portfolio quality of illiquid banks, which is also the probability that an average illiquid bank will be able to pay its bond. Given¸G; if the bond price is set at p S =¸G, the government will break even in its LOLR operations.
By setting bond price p G the government can a¤ect the operation of the interbank market. For example, by setting a higher price, i.e. p G >¸G; the government can provide subsidies (cheaper loans) to illiquid banks. However, as long as the government is not able to di¤erentiate the quality of the illiquid banks, there will be only one bond price, p G , for all illiquid banks. Thus, a better-quality illiquid bank still faces a higher marginal cost of borrowing than an average bank even with the presence of government LOLR policy. Speci…cally, the marginal cost of borrowing a government bail-out bond for a bank m with a quality of¸m is¸m G p G . Obviously, the cost increases with the quality of the banks, i.e., with¸m.
It is easy to see that for a given¸G and p G there exists a¸g such that for¸m >¸g; the expected net return of the bank E (R) < 0: Applying Proposition 4, banks witḩ m >¸g will not accept the government bail-out condition and will be run by their depositors. However, unlike the case of no government intervention, the run of the solvent banks will not lead to the collapse of the interbank market as long as the government has enough reserves to support the bond price at p G level.
We suppose that the government's objective is to select a bail-out strategy to halt bank runs with a minimum social-cost. Without knowing the quality of each bank loan portfolio, the government should set p G high enough to avoid the liquidation of the better banks. However, this implies that all the illiquid banks will be bailed out.
We call this a bail-out trap.
Proposition 6
In an economy with single-bank …nancing, if the government has enough reserves but does not know the quality of an illiquid bank's loan portfolio, the best it can do is to bail out all illiquid banks indiscriminately. This prevents a bank run but generates a bail-out trap.
The reason why we call this result as a bail-out trap is that a "lemon" problem in the interbank market is generated due to banks' lack of commitment in dealing with projects. However, if the government always bail out all illiquid banks, it induces more moral hazard problems in the banking sector. In the long run, the economy becomes a victim of the government's LOLR policy, which softens budget constraints in the banking sector.
In the above analysis the government has su¢cient resources to bail out all illiquid banks (many insolvent), thus a bank run can be averted. If the number of illiquid banks is large and the government has a binding budget constraint to deal with them, it would not be able to bail out all of them. Given the lemon problem in the banking system, the best the government could do would be to bail out illiquid banks randomly. But in adopting this policy, contagious risks cannot be eliminated. This is because without knowing the banks' solvency and which bank will be bailed out by the government, late consumers face the uncertainty of losing their deposits. In fact, a government refusal to lend can be interpreted by the market as a bad signal about the bank. This may explain what occurred to Finance One (a large …nancial institution) in Thailand, which declared bankrupt in June 1997 after being denied help from the government. The failure of Finance One in turn triggered a contagious bank run before the currency crisis (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1998) . 18 Thus, we have the following result:
Corollary 3 In a SBF economy, if the government does not have enough capacity to bail out all the illiquid banks, the best the government could do would be to bail out the banks randomly; as a result, there may be a contagious run on all those banks that do not receive government assistance.
The major obstacle which causes the failure of the interbank market and the malfunction of the LOLR policy is an informational problem. One may wonder whether the problem can be solved if the LOLR policy is designed better. A scheme, which would induce stronger banks to seek government assistance while leave weaker banks to deal with bank runs, would require the government to reverse its bond payment scheme such that a borrowing bank should pay more in a deteriorating state than that in a good state. However, the feasibility of such a policy is limited by the fact that banks have only limited liabilities.
Another possible design would be to use the LOLR policy as a screening device by the government in a SBF economy to sort out its informational problem so that only solvent banks can solve their liquidity problems in the interbank market. In this scheme, an LOLR policy is divided into two parts: providing liquidity and screening banks. Here, we focus on screening banks. Instead of targeting solvent banks, the central bank's LOLR package targets insolvent banks. The bail-out scheme is such 18 We thank Charles Goodhart for his suggestions regarding this elaboration and for the example.
that the central bank bond is distributed to any bank that asks for help. The bond is associated with a pro…t tax, in that all the pro…ts of a solvent bank will be taken away, thus making such help not worthwhile for a solvent bank. However, with a limited liability, an insolvent bank expects to repay nothing for the help from the central bank. Thus, all the insolvent illiquid banks will ask for help and all the illiquid banks left in the market will be solvent banks. Although the above scheme might be 'optimal' since only illiquid banks need to be bailed out by the government, this 'optimal' LOLR policy would still lead to a bail-out trap.
Comparing with a SBF economy, in a MBF economy the solvency of an illiquid bank is a public knowledge which both the market and the government are aware of.
Thus, if there is a need for the government to intervene, it can choose to bail out only solvent banks. Therefore, in addition to the higher e¢ciency of the government rescue plan, there is less of a burden on the government's plan because insolvent banks can be identi…ed and do not need to be bailed out.
Corollary 4
In a MBF economy, if the interbank bond market cannot provide su¢-cient liquidity to illiquid banks, the government can always bail out only the solvent banks. Consequently, contagious risks are much smaller than in a SBF economy.
Our theory also has strong policy implications for the limitations of central bank's LOLR policy and banking system reform. With respect to potential moral hazard problems related to the central bank's bail-out policy, it is argued that focusing on large banks, i.e., the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) doctrine of the LOLR (Goodhart and Huang, 1998) and a random LOLR policy (Freixas, 1999), may be preferable. Our theory implies that although a TBTF policy may be optimum when attention is restricted to a short run LOLR issue, it may not be a good policy for the long run. This is because a TBTF policy may distort the bank managers' incentives and thus induce ine¢cient bank mergers. When all banks are large, TBTF policy would not work properly, and a random operations of the LOLR would not be feasible since each bank is too large to be allowed to fail (what occurred in Japan and Korea may shed some light on this). Even worse, if the number of banks is small in an economy, it is more likely that this may lead to a bail-out trap for the economy. Therefore, the optimal LOLR policy should not be isolated from reforms of the banking institution.
In the long run, reforms related to hardening the budget constraints are a key to preventing the central bank's LOLR policy from degenerating into a bail-out trap.
Financial Liberalization
An important policy issue concerns the liberalization of …nancial markets and institutions, whose e¤ects can be analyzed in our model by comparing a one bank economy (before liberalization) with an M-bank economy (after liberalization). According to our theory, a one-bank economy must be a SBF economy. Moreover, because all the deposits in the economy are pooled in one bank, the risk of facing a liquidity shock or a bank run will be greatly reduced. Theoretically, if the economy has a su¢ciently large number of depositors, then the probability of an excessive early withdrawals from the bank will be negligible. That is, although ine¢cient, this one-bank economy is almost immune to bank runs or …nancial crisis. In contrast to a one-bank economy, an M-bank SBF economy is very sensitive to a bank run contagion due to the lemon problem in the interbank lending market. This comparison has important implications for banking policies and reforms. The basic message is that a liberalization of …nancial institutions must be conditional on measures to harden the budget constraints. If liberalized banks are operating under SBF and measures to harden the budget constraints are not in place, a liberalization policy may greatly destabilize the …nancial system! This simple analysis captures some characteristics of banking systems reform and liberalization. For instance, a major reform measure in the transition from a centralized economy to a market economy is to change the banking system from a one-bank system (at least conceptually one can regard all state banks as branches of one bankthe state bank) into a multi-bank system. Many of the banking system liberalization reforms in East Asia before 1997 shared this spirit as well. According to our theory, a banking system reform designed to enhance competition as described above can create huge contagious risks to the system, if additional measures to harden budget constraints in the system are not implemented simultaneously.
Corruption and Financial Crisis
In our basic model we do not deal with corruptions in the economy. All the problems are generated from corruption-free institutions. However, it is well documented that there are serious corruptions in some of the Asian economies, and it is a well held belief that corruptions in those economies, particularly in Philippines and Thailand, and probably also in Malaysia and even Korea, had a¤ected their …nancial crises.
Our model also allows us to examine how corruption a¤ects …nancial institutions and changes the likelihood of …nancial crisis.
There are two aspects of corruption that can be introduced into our model. The …rst aspect is that corruption itself can be a mechanism of soft-budget constraint (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). That is, when it is discovered that a project is a bad one at date 2, …rms and …nancial institutions in a corrupted economy have options to bribe the government to bailout the project even if the project is not ex post pro…table. That is, with corruption there will be less e¤ective …nancial discipline in the economy.
In addition, another aspect of corruption can also be incorporated into our model.
That is corruption can a¤ect selection of projects. This aspect will signi…cantly alter our results on the timing of …nancial crisis. To illustrate this, we suppose that at date 0 there is an asymmetric information that entrepreneurs know the distribution better; moreover, some risky projects may bene…t some entrepreneurs. In a corrupted economy the entrepreneur may bribe the bank to get the project …nanced.
Thus, on average projects selected in a corrupted economy will be riskier than in a corruption-free economy. Therefore, even in a less developed economy like Philip-pines and Thailand, many high risk projects can be chosen because of corruption. As corruptions not only degenerate …nancial disciplines but also make project selection towards more risky ones, Proposition 3 implies that a corrupted economy is more likely to have …nancial crisis.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper endogenizes contagious risks and …nancial crises from the perspective of …nancial institutions and corporate …nance. We began our analysis by examining informational problems not only between entrepreneurs and banks but also in the interbank market. Then we showed how in a SBF economy the information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and banks leads to a "lemon" problem in the interbank lending market, which further impedes strong banks from securing loans to solve liquidity shortage problems when they face liquidity shocks. Thus, bank runs may break out, which further exacerbate the lemon problem and can lead to a collapse of the entire banking system. In contrast, under MBF economy entrepreneurs reveal their private information to banks timely, as a result information about the quality of the banks is disclosed to the whole banking system timely. This allows the interbank lending markets to function well in providing loans to illiquid but solvent banks. Thus, solvent banks will be rescued and …nancial crisis avoided.
Our theory sheds some light to reconcile the seemingly paradoxical phenomena between the "East Asian Miracle" in the three decades prior to 1997 and the East Asian …nancial crisis in the period after 1997. In the period of early development, that is, the catching-up period of the 1960s to the early 1990s, the uncertainty of projects was low due to the nature of technological imitation. In this situation, our theory predicts that tin a SBF economy there are no project liquidation and no bank run.
That is, a SBF economy appears even to outperform a MBF economy, and it may attract many investments. However, if the uncertainty of projects rises precipitously, for example, when an economy moves on technological frontiers (e.g., South Korea since the early 1990s), the negative e¤ects of a SBF economy will dominate, …nally leading to trouble in the …nancial system. Some …nal remarks about our theory are in order. First, although our theory is motivated by observations of the East Asian …nancial crisis, it is a very basic model aiming to improve one's general understanding of …nancial crises. In the real world, there may not exist a simple MBF economy such that all bad projects are liquidated as cleanly and early as in our model. That is, even in a well-developed market economy there exist some SBF …nancial and economic institutions which may cause bank runs or even …nancial crises, but at a lesser degree than in an economy where SBF predominate. However, the basic message of our theory is clear.
Second, in order to study …nancial crises from a purely economic perspective, we provide an institutional foundation of soft-budget constraints where there are no political problems and every agent maximizes his own economic gain. But our theory of …nancial crises is general enough that any institutional foundation of a soft-budget constraint economy (e.g. a foundation based on political considerations, Segal, 1998) applies and can produce the same qualitative results.
Third, an important policy implication from our theory for …nancial system reform and for …nancial-crisis-prevention is that the transparency of the banking system is critical. However, transparency cannot be achieved by imposing government regulations alone. In fact, with wrong targets in transparency a regulation can cause a back …re in the sense that the commitment device of banks can be destroyed even in a MBF economy. That is because the commitment device relies on information asymmetry between banks. Therefore, an e¤ective reform can only be achieved by reforming the …nancial institutions to tighten budget constraints at the micro level. They show that the illiquidity of the domestic …nancial system is at the center of the …nancial crisis in emerging markets. We regard the Chang and Velasco model to complement our theory. In fact, we can readily apply their approach to extend our model and explain how domestic …nancial institutions interact with international …nancial issues and how an over-borrowing syndrome in the sense of McKinnon and Pill (1997) is generated.
Our theory has implications for many policy solutions proposed in the literature.
For example, Dewatripont-Tirole (1994) propose the following policies to deal with bank failures: 1) to liquidate illiquid banks; 2) to allow solvent and liquid banks to take over illiquid banks; and 3) to provide loans to illiquid banks. Our theory demonstrates that in a MBF economy, with su¢cient information about the solvency of illiquid banks, the government should consider the trade-o¤ between closing down illiquid banks and letting solvent liquid banks take over illiquid banks; or to provide loans to solvent illiquid banks. However, in a SBF economy, without information about the solvency of the banks, the government has no other choice but to provide loans to all illiquid banks or to provide loans to a proportion of them randomly.
With respect to nationalizing illiquid banks, our theory implies that this may work as an emergency measure if nationalization has an informational value such that with control rights the government may be able to identify solvent banks. However, this may not work in the long run because a nationalized bank will likely generate a SBF environment.
where q = Pr(s A > s B ). 20 Con ‡ict interest assumption A-2: for any s h > s l , Proof of Lemma 1 21 We show that if each bank J is able to observe only s J (J = A or B) after I 3 is invested, under (A-1) and (A-2) there is no e¢cient incentive compatible scheme q(s A ; s B ) and T (s A ; s B ) which can induce bank J to tell the true value of s J ; thus there is no e¢cient scheme to reorganize the project. As a result, the banks choose to liquidate the bad project.
In the following proof, we …rst analyze bank A's incentive problem. For this purpose, we …x s B at an arbitrary value s ¤ 2 (0; 1). 
Given compensation scheme T (s
20 Any randomization based on e q 2 [0; 1] and e q 6 = q cannot get a better result than (A-1.2). 21 The proof of this Lemma is in ‡uenced by Maskin (1992) which shows that an information asymmetry between two parties can make auctions ine¢cient.
The case of bank B can be proved by symmetry.
Given the above results, any randomization between liquidation and reorganization at date 2 will be worse than liquidation. Thus, the probability of liquidation is 1 ¡ p = 1.
